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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is from the Minute Entry, dated April 1, 1994; Order 
Granting Summary Judgment dated May 9, 1994; Minute Entry dated June 
22, 1994; Order dated July 18, 1994 (denying Motion for Reconsideration) 
entered by Judge Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court. The Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(d) 
U.C.A., as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding 
that there were no issues of material fact in 
connection with defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in face of plaintiff's unequivocal denial of 
defendant's statement of undisputed facts? 
Standard of Review for Issue I 
In reviewing decisions of the trial courts, this Court accords the trial 
court's statement of law, statutory interpretation, and/or legal conclusions no 
particular deference but reviews them for correctness. State of Humphrey. 
823 P. 2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P., 2d 
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 11 S.Ct. 120 (1990); Bountiful v. Rilev. 78 P. 
2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. 
1 
App. 1990). 
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court must 
reject said findings of fact if there was not sufficient evidence to support such 
a finding. Deference is to be given the trier of fact. 
ISSUED 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration in the face of 
plaintiff's prior counsel's affidavit that no agreement 
as to the final amount of the purported settlement had 
ever been reached? 
Standard of Review for Issue II 
In reviewing decisions of the trial courts, this Court accords the trial 
court's statement of law, statutory interpretation, and/or legal conclusions no 
particular deference but reviews them for correctness. State of Humphrey. 
823 P. 2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); Citv of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P., 2d 
513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 11 S.Ct. 120 (1990); Bountiful v. Rilev. 78 P. 
2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court must 
reject said findings of fact if there was not sufficient evidence to support such 
a finding. Deference is to be given the trier of fact. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following court rules and/or statutes are reproduced and can be 
found in the addenda to this brief, Addendum A. 
Ut.R.C.Proc., Rule 56 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Gary A. Porter ("Porter") was hired to perform excavation work on a 
project for defendant West American Finance Corporation ("West 
American"). Porter was not paid for the work performed, liened the job on 
October 30,1992 and filed suit in May of 1993 to collect and foreclose on the 
lien. The principal balance due to plaintiff/appellant Porter was $25,827.50. 
Settlement negotiations began. West American made numerous offers, and 
sent settlement checks in October and November of 1993 in the hope that 
Porter would accept them. But, Porter never agreed to the amounts offered, 
revoked all prior offers in early December, and returned the checks in 
January of 1994. West American answered and then filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment claiming that a settlement (accord and satisfaction) had 
been reached. Porter opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment with a flat, 
unequivocal denial that any settlement had been reached. Yet, Judge Hanson 
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ruled that because (1) West American's attorney said that he had reached a 
settlement with Porter's prior attorney, Dale Dorius, and (2) Porter did not 
produce an affidavit from Dale Dorius denying that a settlement had been 
reached, there was "no issue of material fact" as to whether Dorius had 
entered into a settlement on Porter's behalf ~ and granted summary 
judgment. Porter moved for reconsideration, and produced an affidavit from 
attorney Dorius which supported Porter's statement that there had been no 
settlement. But, Judge Hanson still refused to reverse himself and let the 
Summary Judgment stand. Porter has filed this appeal because he feels that 
he properly and completely disputed West American's statement of facts, 
thereby creating a dispute as to material fact, which should have precluded 
summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gary A. Porter completed work on an excavation project for West 
American on October 10,1992, with a balance due of approximately $25,600. 
When West American did not pay Porter for this work, Porter filed a lien on 
the project on October 30, 1992. West American still did not pay Porter for 
the work performed. In May of 1993, Porter's then attorney, Dale Dorius 
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("Dorius") filed suit to collect the monies due to Porter. In June of 1993, 
Porter filed an Amended Complaint. 
Settlement discussions began. As of August 31, 1993, Porter offered to 
settle for $25,600, less $3135.00, plus interest at 8% from the date of filing the 
mechanic's lien (October 30, 1992) and $1,500.00 for attorney's fees (see 
Dorius letter to West American attorney Steven Lybbert ("Lybbert") attached 
hereto as Exhibit A). West American rejected this proposal, indicating that 
it would pay interest, but not attorney's fees, and asked for an additional 
discount for monies purportedly paid by West American to one of Porter's 
subcontractors, Pioneer Sand and Grave ("Pioneer"). In this regard, on 
October 19, 1993, Lybbert wrote a letter, with attached accounting, claiming 
that West American had paid Pioneer $7666.00, which amount he deducted 
from the proposed settlement amount, and tendered a check to Porter for 
$15,591.42 (a copy of Lybbert's letter to Dorius dated October 19, 1993 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
Porter did not agree with this proposal, challenging the figures used by 
Lybbert and the assertion that West American should get an additional 
$7666.00 discount in addition to the $3135 discount which Porter had offered 
on August 31, 1993. Trying to assuage Porter's concerns and convince him 
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to agree to the additional $7666.00 discount being requested, Mr. Lybbert 
wrote a letter to Dorius dated October 28, 1993, enclosing a copy of the front 
and back of the West American check to Pioneer, and a new set of 
calculations -- stating that it appeared to Mr. Lybbert that if Porter agreed 
with the $7666.00 discount due to the Pioneer payment, an additional $637.20 
would be owed by West American to Porter (a copy of Lybbert's October 28, 
1993 letter to Dorius is attached hereto as Exhibit C). 
This prompted Dorius to fax a letter dated October 28, 1993 to Porter, 
attaching a copy of the Pioneer check, stating that it looked like West 
American would owe another $637.20 if Porter agreed to the $7666.00 
discount for the Pioneer payment - AND ASKING IF PORTER WOULD 
AGREE TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. A copy of this letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit D). Clearly, no settlement had yet been reached - Porter had not 
agreed to the additional $7666.00 discount requested by West American. 
In fact, on October 28, 1993, Porter faxed Dorius a letter and 
accounting disputing West American's claim for a set off of $7666.00 (because 
Pioneer's bill had only been for $7044.75, and Pioneer could not find a 
payment from West American for $6476), and instructing Dorius that Porter 
would not agree to the $3135.00 discount and the $7044.75 Pioneer discount. 
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A copy of this letter from Porter to Dorius is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
Clearly, there had been no meeting of the minds on settlement. 
On November 5, 1993, Mr. Lybbert wrote Dorius a letter (Exhibit F) 
setting forth new calculations — assuming that Porter would agree to the 
additional $7666.00 discount being requested by West American (but to which 
Porter had already told Dorius that Porter would not agree) ~ which Mr. 
Lybbert claimed showed that West American would only owe $216.00 more 
(in addition to the previously tendered check in the amount of $15,591.42). 
Mr. Lybbert tendered an additional check in the amount of $216.00 ~ 
bringing the total tendered to $15,807.42 - with another letter to Dorius dated 
November 12, 1993 (Exhibit G). 
On November 23, 1993, Dorius wrote Porter a letter claiming to be 
confused as to why Porter was "claimpng] that you are still owed $3,100.00 
over [West American's] offer" and asking Porter to fax to Dorius a copy of 
Porter's accounting. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
Two things are obvious from this letter: (1) Dorius wants to settle the case — 
but (2) his client, Mr. Porter does not and has not yet agreed to settle. 
On December 13, 1993, Mr. Lybbert filed an answer to the Amended 
Complaint, and sent a letter to Dorius complaining that he thought that there 
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had been an agreement, but making a "final offer" of settlement (A copy of 
which letter is attached hereto as Exhibit F) - which "final offer" was not 
accepted by Porter. 
On or about January 18, 1994, West American filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment claiming that a settlement had been reached, the agreed 
upon funds had been tendered, and had not been returned. Specifically, West 
American's "Undisputed Facts" were as follows: 
1. Between August 24, 1993 and August 31, 1993 the 
parties, negotiating through their attorneys, reached an agreement 
that defendants would pay the principal amount of plaintiffs 
claim, less a $3135 offset in compromise of a claim by defendants 
that they were entitled to an $11,500 offset. 
2. Between August 31, 1993 and September 27, 1993 the 
parties, still negotiating through their attorneys, agreed that 
defendants would pay interest on the principal amount of 
plaintiffs claim, less the offset, at 8% per annum from the date 
plaintiffs mechanic's lien was recorded. 
3. On October 19, 1993 West American sent a check to 
plaintiffs attorney for $15,591.42 "in full settlement of the above-
referenced action." 
4. After further discussions between counsel for each side, 
West American Finance offered to pay another $216 "in order to 
finally settle this matter." 
5. After being instructed to do so by plaintiffs attorney, 
defendants' attorney forwarded a check from West American 
Finance to plaintiffs attorney on November 12,1993 for $216.00. 
The letter which accompanied the check stated, in part: 
£ 
"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which, when 
added to the $15,591.42 previously tendered, is full settlement of 
the above-referenced action. 
6. As of this date the two checks tendered by West 
American Finance to plaintiffs attorney have not been returned. 
(Query whether this statement of undisputed facts is sufficient to 
warrant the granting of summary judgment.) 
Also in support of this motion, West American offered the affidavit of 
its counsel, Mr. Lybbert. On the issue of settlement, Mr. Lybbert stated in 
paragraph 13 that "Sometime between November 5 and November 11, 1993 
I again discussed the matter with Mr. Dorius by telephone. He instructed me 
to obtain a second check from West American so that the matter could be 
finally settled." In paragraph 14, Mr. Lybbert stated that in a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Dorius in early December, "Mr. Dorius did not deny 
that a settlement had been reached. He merely stated that he would contact 
Mr. Porter." 
Upon these two statements alone West American argued that a binding 
agreement was entered into between West American and Porter to settle the 
case — there is nothing in writing from Porter or Dorius which ever accepted 
the settlement proposals being made by West American. The only written 
offer ever made by Porter was the August 31,1993 offer » which was rejected 
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by West American's September 16, 1993 counteroffer. Neither Porter nor 
Dorius ever expressly indicated acceptance of any of West American's many 
written offers thereafter. 
More importantly — Mr. Dorius' statements, as reported by Mr. 
Lybbert in his affidavit, do not constitute an acceptance of West American's 
settlement offers. In the November conversation, Dorius merely said some 
thing like "get me a check" for the additional $216 being offered by West 
American. This was not an acceptance. It was a request by an attorney who 
is trying to get his client to agree to a settlement, to get a check in hand so 
that he can dangle it under his client's nose in an effort to try and get the 
client to agree. There mere asking for an additional check is not, in and of 
itself, evidence of an agreement. 
In the December conversation, Mr. Lybbert properly and honestly states 
that Mr. Dorius "did not deny" that there had been a settlement. It is obvious 
that Mr. Dorius also did not say that there had been an agreement either. 
Nothing of probative value can be derived from Mr. Dorius' silence, or non-
response — other than that Mr. Dorius did not or could not give an answer 
affirming that an agreement had been reached. 
Porter opposed West American's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
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the following Statement of Disputed Facts, supported by the sworn verification 
of Gary A. Porter: 
1. Plaintiff admits that the parties discussed settlement, but 
denies that any agreement was reached (refutes Defendants' 
Statement of Facts Nos. 1-6). 
2. From the letters attached to the Affidavit of Steven H. 
Lybbert as exhibits, the following chronology is apparent: 
(a) On August 31, 1993, defendants offered to settle 
for $22,465 (the principal less $3135) plus an additional discount 
for payments purportedly made by defendants to one of plaintiffs 
suppliers (See Exhibit A to the Lybbert Affidavit); 
(b) Plaintiff counter-offered that he would agree to a 
total discount of $3135 in settlement of his claims — no agreement 
to any additional discount for the purported payments to 
plaintiffs supplier (See Exhibit B to the Lybbert Affidavit); 
(c) Defendants continued to try and get plaintiff to 
agree to the $3135 discount plus an additional discount for the 
purported payment to plaintiffs supplier (See Exhibits C through 
F to the Lybbert Affidavit); 
(d) But, the plaintiff never acknowledged in writing 
or otherwise that these counter-proposals were acceptable — 
rather, on December 8, 1993, plaintiff documented his position 
that no discount beyond the $3135 was ever agreed to by him (See 
Exhibit G to the Lybbert Affidavit), (refutes Defendants' 
Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 1-6) 
3. Upon the withdrawal of Dale Dorius as counsel for 
plaintiff herein, all checks tendered by defendants were returned 
to Mr. Lybbert (refutes Defendants' Statement of Undisputed 
Facts No. 6). 
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West American replied to this flat, unequivocal denial of West 
American's statement of undisputed facts with essentially two arguments: (1) 
although the letters attached to Mr. Lybbert's affidavit do not themselves 
demonstrate that a settlement was reached, Mr. Lybbert's statements in his 
affidavit in paragraphs 13 and 14 (quoted above in this brief) do show that a 
settlement had been agreed to; and (2) if Dorius had not in fact agreed to a 
settlement, why didn't Porter produce an affidavit from Dorius refuting 
Lybbert's claims. 
The trial court, in its minute entry dated April 1, 1994, adopted West 
American's argument in Reply, and ruled that based upon Lybbert's 
testimony in paragraphs 13 and 14, which had not been refuted by an 
affidavit from Dorius himself (rather than from Porter), a settlement had been 
reached "sometime between November 5, 1993 and November 11, 1993." 
Porter objected to this ruling, and filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 
Prior to filing said motion, Porter's current counsel wrote a letter to Dorius 
on or about April 12, 1994, asking Porter to provide an affidavit stating that 
no settlement had been reached. Dorius failed to do so, so the Motion for 
Reconsideration was not initially supported by an affidavit from Mr. Dorius. 
However, Porter's current counsel wrote a second letter to Mr. Dorius on or 
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about May 14, 1994 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J) asking 
for clarification as to whether a settlement had been entered into or not. In 
response to this letter, Mr. Dorius provided the trial court with an affidavit 
that he drafted (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit K), which stated 
the following: 
"3. That there was an agreed to settlement of the principal 
amount owed to Plaintiff plus eight percent interest minus 
$3135.00, and Defendant would drop the $11,000.00 counterclaim 
set off. 
4. There was not a finalized agreement as to the amount 
that Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck charges. 
5. The outstanding issue is whether or not Defendant paid 
Pioneer Trucking, and if these amounts are proper offsets. This 
appears to be the only dispute in regard to the settlement." 
Despite Porter having provided the trial court with this unequivocal 
denial from Dorius that a final agreement had been reached, Judge Hanson 
denied Porter's motion for reconsideration. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
The Rules of Civil Procedure, Code of Judicial Administration and 
statutory law all require a trial court to deny a motion for summary judgment 
whenever the opposing party (1) sets forth a statement of disputed facts in his 
opposing memorandum which disputes the moving party's statement of 
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undisputed facts, and (2) which statement of disputed facts is supported by 
sworn testimony. In this case, Porter's statement of disputed facts clearly 
places every fact alleged by West American in dispute, and is supported by the 
sworn verification of Gary A. Porter. Further, the trial court's decision to 
consider attorney Lybbert's affidavit to be more convincing than plaintiff 
Porter's sworn verification refuting the same, violated the requirement that 
the trial court construe the evidence presented in connection with a motion for 
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Finally, 
when Porter ultimately was able to produce an affidavit from attorney Dori us 
which refuted Lybbert's affidavit, the trial court abused its discretion in 
ignoring this testimony and allowing the Summary Judgment to stand. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Plaintiffs flat and unequivocal denial, under oath, of 
the facts upon which defendant relied for defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was sufficient to 
preclude the granting of Summary Judgment. 
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted if the trial court 
finds, as a matter of law, that there is no dispute as to any material fact. 
Further, in deciding whether or not there is a dispute as to material fact, the 
trial court 
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is required to give every benefit of the doubt to the party opposing the motion 
— all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the opposing party. If, after 
strictly applying these rules designed to protect a party's right to his or her 
day in court, a trial court can honestly say that there is no issue of material 
fact, then summary adjudication is warranted. 
However, if the opposing party flatly and squarely disputes the factual 
allegations contained in the moving party's statement of undisputed facts, the 
motion for summary judgment must be denied. In this case, West American 
set forth its "Undisputed Facts" in six numbered paragraphs. Nowhere in 
these six paragraphs does West American state that a final agreement was 
reached which is binding upon Porter. This deficiency alone should be 
sufficient to warrant a reversal. Furthermore, Porter's "Statement of 
Disputed Facts" squarely denies that a settlement was ever reached - and 
clearly states why. Summary Judgment could not and should not have been 
granted under these circumstances. 
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Point II 
Mr. Dorius' Affidavit supplied to the Court in connection with 
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, corroborated plaintiff's 
prior statements under oath disputing the defendant's assertion 
that a settlement had been reached — the Motion for 
Reconsideration should have been granted. 
Porter was justifiably shocked when the trial court ignored his clear and 
direct refutation of West American's assertion that a settlement had been 
reached. However, he immediately set about to obtain the "new evidence" 
which had not been before the trial court - an affidavit from Mr. Dorius 
refuting Mr. Lybbert's affidavit. With some difficulty, Porter was finally able 
to provide the Court which just such an affidavit, albeit in a Reply brief. 
This affidavit was properly before the trial court. The purpose of a Motion 
for Reconsideration is to bring just such new evidence to the trier of fact's 
attention. The new affidavit clearly demonstrated that summary judgment 
was not appropriate in this case ~ there simply never was a meeting of the 
minds on a settlement in this matter. The trial court abused its discretion in 
ignoring this critical new evidence and not setting aside the summary 
judgment. 
1$ 
CONCLUSION 
This is really a simple appeal. All of the rules governing the granting 
of summary judgment were violated in this case. The moving party's 
statement of undisputed facts was insufficient to warrant the granting of 
summary judgment. The trial court ignored the fact that Porter disputed each 
of West American's "Undisputed Facts," and improperly gave greater weight 
to West American's affidavit than to Porter's sworn verification of his 
"Statement of Disputed Facts." Finally, the trial court improperly failed to 
set aside the summary judgment despite the fact that Porter had provided the 
Court with attorney Dorms' sworn affidavit refuting the fundamental assertion 
that a settlement had actually been reached. The summary judgment granted 
herein must be set aside, and Mr. Porter allowed his day in court. 
DATED the 6th day of February, 1995. 
sy> 
Steffensen 
for Appell 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1995, I caused four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be xxx mailed, 
postage prepaid; and a single copy to be hand-delivered by xxx fax 
and/or by personal delivery; addressed to: 
LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
Attn: Steven H. Lybbert 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax (801) 363-8512 
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
tame have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default 
* (1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ant*. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the i 
tion or after service of a motion for summary ju 
ment by the adverse party, move with or without a 
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his & | 
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-]] 
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the 1 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to tha| 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. Thel* 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if thej 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,! 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any' 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to *1 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, J| 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the! 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine] 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on J 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered up 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial i 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, 1 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before*] 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable i 
certain what material facts exist without substanti 
controversy and what material facts are actually and j 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make] 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-1 
stantial controversy, including the extent to which | 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contra* J 
versy, and directing such further proceedings in 1 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and t 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidav 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set foi 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, • 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compefc 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or < 
tified copies of ail papers or parts thereof referred i 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served! 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be t 
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to i 
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion i 
summary judgment is made and supported as 
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest i 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,1 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided! 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing i " 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does notl 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall % 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should | 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing i 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present 1 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 1 
court may refuse the application for judgment or i 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 1 
had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it. 
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 1 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this i 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose! 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party i 
ploying them to pejti 
the reasonable expert 
vits caused him tq j | 
ney's fees, and anyfi 
be adjudged guilty « 
Rule 57. Declaraioj 
The procedure fbi$ 
ment pursuant to (3ty 
shall be in accordana 
to trial by jury mqfj 
stances and in them 
39. The existence %, 
not preclude a judging 
where it is appronqjpjj 
hearing of an action 
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Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upo 
the court otherwise 4 
sions of Rule 54(b), | 
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If there is a special J 
companied by answen 
a jury pursuant to Ru 
appropriate judgmeo 
signed by the clerk i 
(b) Judgment in o 
in Subdivision (a) he 
Rule 55, all judgment 
and filed with the cli 
(c) When judgmen 
ter of actions and jui 
complete and shall b< 
poses, except the creai 
when the same is sig 
provided. The clerk si 
tion of the judgment is 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signix 
prevailing party shall 
signing or entry of jud 
shall file proof of servi 
of the court. However, 
appeal is not affected 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment after 
dies after a verdict or < 
and before judgment, j 
rendered thereon. 
if) Judgment by © 
ment by confession is a 
seeking the same must 
in which the judgment 
verified by the defend 
(1) If thejudgme 
due or to become d 
claim and that tk 
justly due or to bi 
(2) If the judgmi 
purpose of securing 
gent liability, it m 
and that the sum c 
ceed the same; 
(3) Itmustauthc 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall there 
v ment, and enter in the 
of the court for the an 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Se 
restrictions, limitations or requirements as the 
regulating authority deems appropriate; to sus-
pend the surety's qualification pending compli-
ance with specified provisions of this rule; or to 
disqualify the surety. The decision shall be based 
on the facts appearing in the file maintained by 
the regulating authority and the facts presented 
in evidence at the hearing. The decision shall 
include the reasons therefor, notice of any right 
of review, and the time limit for filing for such a 
review. The decision shall be served upon the 
surety by mailing the same, via first class mail, 
to the surety's last known address on file with 
the regulating authority. 
(H) Any party aggrieved by the decision of the 
regulating authority may file a petition for judi-
cial review within thirty days after the date of 
the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-15. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; 
January 1, 1992; February 1, 1993.) 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipali-
ties are hereby designated as locations of trial courts 
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; 
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park 
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; 
West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial 
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may 
hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the 
court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all dis-
trict and circuit courts except proceedings before the 
court commissioners and the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to 
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraor-
dinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memo-
randa. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant 1 
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-I 
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem l^ 
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 1 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the \ 
"statement of material facts" as provided in para*" 
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court | 
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applies*:] 
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, j 
the application shall state the length of the prin-
cipal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 1 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include J 
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed \ 
five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a mo-
tion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the re*. 
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-| 
position to the motion within ten days after seT*! 
vice of the motion, the moving party may notifyf 
the clerk to submit the matter to the court fori 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this J 
rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving partyl 
may serve and file a reply memorandum withinl 
five days after service of the responding party's < 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply \ 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk J 
to submit the matter to the court for decisional 
The notification shall be in the form of a separatej 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to 
mit for Decision." The notification shall containj 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neitl 
party files a notice, the motion will not be su 
mitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion*! 
The points and authorities in support of a motion" 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section ; 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine, 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separata 1 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refei 
to those portions of the record upon which 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mq 
tion. The points and authorities in opposition I 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin wit] 
a section that contains a concise statement of i 
terial facts as to which the party contends a gen-
uine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be1 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record
 ; 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-; 
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or \ 
sentences of the movant's facts that are dispute 
All material facts set forth in the movant's stato 
ment and properly supported by an accurate \ 
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted i 
the purpose of summary judgment unless i 
cally controverted by the opposing party's stati 
ment. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 1 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, c 
requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In 
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(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
f
 would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
• action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
j, in support of or in opposition to a motion may file 
^a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
\ the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
i issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
?r denial of the motion has been authoritatively de-
cided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the re-
questing party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two 
working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies 
and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal memo-
randa, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and no-
j and for good cause shown, the court may grant a 
for an expedited disposition in any case 
\ time is of the essence and compliance with the 
isions of this rule would be impracticable or 
Sere the motion does not raise significant legal is-
Hes and could be resolved summarily. 
r(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
[ motion or at a party's request may direct arguments 
itf any motion by telephone conference without court |0j>pearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
ilephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re-
" by counsel. 
rided effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
91.) 
4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases, 
at: 
fM:To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery 
tents. 
"To establish a limitation on discovery procedures 
tthin 30 days of trial. 
| Applicability: 
ft.This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and 
dt Courts. 
itement of the Rule: 
Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 
[ and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall | not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court, 
t but shall file only the original certificate of service 
stating that the discovery requests have been served 
on the other parties and the date of service. The re-
sponding party shall file a similar certificate with the 
clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall 
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service 
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request 
and proof of service upon the opposing party or coun-
sel. The party responding to the discovery request 
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of 
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or 
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall 
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the 
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown 
so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance 
with a discovery request or a motion which relies 
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discovery request or response which is at issue in the 
motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of 
the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discov-
ery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All dis-
covery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other docu-
ments filed with the court no later than thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge as-
signed to the case upon notice to the other parties in 
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall 
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for 
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of 
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permit-
ting such discovery will prevent the case from going 
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to 
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date 
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or 
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of 
the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
and requesting jury instructions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and 
Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented 
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in 
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury in-
structions at any time prior to the submission of the 
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the 
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing 
and state in full the instruction requested. Each re-
quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
T-^ f m *- j - ^ • BRANCH OFFICE 
Dale M. Dorms P O B O X 7 2 6 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 4 ? MAIN STRECT 
GUNNISON UTAH 84634 
(801) 528 7206 
AOMITTCO 
UTAH STAT* 8AM 119651 
CALIFORNIA STATC BAM H9A8I 
COIOMAOO STATC BAM H908) 
August 31, 1993 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance 
Corporation, et al. 
Dear Mr. Lybbert: 
Per your offer of settlement my client has authorized me to 
submit the following. 
My client would be willing to accept $25,600.00 minus offset of 
$3,135.00 on condition your client pay him interest at the legal 
rate of interest of ten percent (10%) from the date of filing the 
Notice of Lien October 30, 1992 and $1,500.00 towards his 
attorney fees. 
This counteroffer will be open for a period of ten (10) days and 
if not accepted will thereafter be withdrawn. Please advise. 
Very truly yours, 
Dale M. Dorius 
Attorney at Law 
DMD:jp 
MAIN OFFICE 
PO Box 695 
20 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BftlGHAM CITY. UTAH 84302 
(801) 723 5210 
EXHIBIT A 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0890 
nittcd also in California Telecopier: (801) 363-8512 
October 19, 1993 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc* v. West American Finance Corp./ et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find my client's check for $15/591.42 in 
full settlement of the above-referenced action. 
Also enclosed is a sheet entitled Gary Porter Settlement 
specifiying how the amount of the check was calculated and copies 
of the two checks showing payment of amounts by West American 
directly to Pioneer Sand & Gravel which were included on Mr. 
Porter f s invoices. 
Also enclosed is a Notice of Dismissal. Assuming you and 
Mr. Porter find the numbers to be in order, once the check clears 
please sign the Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I 
can file it with the court. 
Finally, please find a Release of Lien which I would like 
Mr. Porter to sign. Once he has signed the Release of Lien, 
please return it to me so that I can file it with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's office. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43A 
Enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. Heiner 
REC'D OCT 2 0 1993 
EXHIBIT B 
GARY PORTER SETTLEMENT 
9-17 
9-15 
9-16 
9-12 
9-09 
9-21 
10-03 
10/20 
$ 2 ,020.00 
6,897.50 
2 ,093.75 
5,068.75 
6,107.50 
7,600.00 
2,090.00 
$25,237.50 
Less Amounts Paid to Pioneer 
per your invoice (see checks) -7,666.00 
Less Settlement Amount 3,135.00 
TOTAL DUE $14,436. 50 
Plus interest at 87„ from 10-30-92 to 
10-30-93 1,154.92 
TOTAL $15,591.42 
Total Invoices; #1 
#2 
#3 
#4 
#5 
#6 
#7 
#8 
STEVEN HXYBBSHT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Suits 808 Beit Building 
841 South Main Street 
Salt take City, Utah 84111 
Telephone; (801) 868-0860 
Admitted ttoo tn QeHfbea* TelccopLen (801) 868-8518 
October 28/ 1993 
VIA FAX 
Dale M. DoriU8, Bsq. 
P.O. BOX 895 
Brigham City/ UT 84302 
*
e :
 Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Cocpw et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the front and back of West 
American's check number 001018 payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel. 
It appears to me that the check vss deposited in Pioneer Sand & 
Gravel's account at Draper Bank & Trust on December 3/ 1992. 
Also enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter 
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter to you. 
The column of numbers on the far right are mine. After 
recalculating interestt it appears that West American may still 
owe $637.20. Mr* Harmsen is out of town. I will need to check 
with him to determine vhy he did not add in the amount of 
"invoice #8"# why he listed "invoice #3" at $2,093.75 rather than 
at $2,633.75/ and why he listed "invoice #5" at $6,107*50 rather 
than at $6/157.SO* If the discrepancies were cleriaal mistakes/ 
I will urge him to cut another check for $637.20 so that we can 
finally resolve this matter. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns* 
Very truly yours/ 
/}m 
Steven H. Lybbert 
3L:cdx43B 
Enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. Heiner 
Dale M. Dorius 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MAIN OFFICE 
P.O. Box 805 
29 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BR1QHAM CITY. UTAH 84302 
1801) 723-9210 
October 28, 1993 
Gary Porter 
Porter & Son's Construction 
9626 S. State St. 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Re: Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance 
Corporation, et al. 
Dear Mr. Porter: 
Enclosed please find front and back of the $6,476.00 check. 
Also, enclosed are previous settlement figures. It appears that 
Mr. Harmson will owe you $637.20. Please advise if this is 
acceptable. 
Very truly yours, 
Dale M. Dorius 
Attorney at Law 
DMD:jp 
Enclosures 
EXHIBIT D 
i 
BRANCH OFFICE 
P.O. Box 726 
47 MAIN STREET 
GUNNISON. UTAH 84634 
(801) 528-7296 
ADMITTED. 
UTAH STATE BAH U965) 
CALIFORNIA STATS BAR U968) 
COLORADO STATE BAR U068I 
l > 
PGRTER & SONS 
CONSTRUCTION 
QUALITY EXCAVATING & UTILITIES 
8626 So. Stale Sandy, Ut. 84070 562-2532 i ^ } 
Oct* 29/ 1993 Rw; Porter & Sons vs. 
west American Finance 
Dear Dale* 
This is in ansver to your letter of accounting dated 10-20-93. 
None of Weot American'^ figures add up. The invoice amounts, 
numbers one thru eight/ on their accounting statement add up 
to |31/877*50 not $25,237*50 as stated* I am enclosing another 
set of invoice copies which add up to $25,827.50. 
I urn also enclosing a co^y of Pion««xa invoice showing their 
truck rental charges for the Northcre*t Job* Their total of 
$7,044.75 does not agree with West Aicericanj amounts as shown 
on their checKs. 
Pioneers truck rental charges $7044,75 
West Americans checks #1018 - $8475 
#103$ - $1190,63 
$7666.63 
The tollowing is an accounting which is correct provided 
West Americans check for $6476 is valid* Pioneer Sand & Gravel 
can rind no record of this payment. 
rtw«t iiufctx ican s e t t l e m e n t 
Total invoices $25,827,50 
less Pioneers invoice 7,044,75 
Total Due $18,782.75 
Plus interest at 8% 
for 12 months $ I,500.22 
$20,282^97 
The amount $3135 i« dis-aiiowBd because I assumed incorrectly 
that this was the amount that West American paid Pioneer. 
It these figures are not accepted, please proceed with a 
trial date immediately* 
Sine* r e l y 
Jgyd^' 
EXHIBIT E 
STEVEN H.LYBBERT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Suite aOU Felt Building 
M l South Main Street 
Salt Luke City, Utah S t i l l 
Taephooej (801) 36&-0890 
AdBttrtftiwiaCtlifona. Tekeopiert (801) 863-8513 
November 5/ 1993 
VIA FAX 
Dale M. Dorius* Bsq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City* UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc, v. West American Finance Corp., et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter 
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter and my 
October 28 letter to you. I have now had an opportunity to 
discuss the discrepancies in invoice numbers 3/ 5 and 8 with 
Steve Harmaen. 
Mr. Harmsen listed invoice #3 at $2,093-75 rather than at 
$2/633.75 because the next to last line of invoice #2 (the one 
dated "Tuea 9-15" containa a $540 charge to pioneer truck for 12 
loads at $540.00. The first line of invoice »3 (the one dated 
9-16-92) is the same charge. In other words, invoice numbers 2 
and 3 contain a $540.00 double billing* 
Mr. Harmsen listed "invoice #5tt at $6/107.50 rather than at 
$6/157.50 because the fourth item on that invoice (the one dated 
9-9-92) is for 11% hours at $100 per hour/ but the "balance" 
column states $1/200.00. It should only be $1/150.00. 
By my calculations/ West American Finance owes another 
$216*00 ($200 principal and $16 interest) in order to finally 
settle this matter. Please consult with Mr. Porter. If that is 
acceptable/ please contact me and I will promptly forward a check 
in that amount« Don't hesitate to call me if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours* 
Steven H« Lybbert 
SL:cd:43C 
enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen EXHIBIT F 
GARY PORTER SETTLEMENT 
Total Invoicesi #1 
#2 
#3 
04 
#5 
#6 
#7 
#8 
y-17 
9-15 
9-16 
9-12 
9-09 
9-21 
10-03 
10/20 
$ 2,020.00 y 
6,897:50/
 fi7^ 
2,093.75 l>" 
5,068.75' _ 
6,107.50 b,irv<S* 
•7^00.60 7*> 
2,090.00" 
-p&fSm^ i-<i ***** 
Leas Amounts Paid to Pioneer 
per your invoice (see checks) «*7,666.00 
.c* 
(, t,t,r-
Less Settlement Amount 3,135.00 - „ ?jT> 
TOTAL DUE $14,436.50 I*. ° ; *• ** 
Plus interest at 87. from 10-30-92 to 
10-30-93 1,154.92 
TOTAL $15,591.42 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
M l South Main Slave! 
Salt Lake City, I Hah 84111 
Telephone: (801) M3-0890 
Admitted also in California Telecopier: (801) tttitt-8512 
November 12, 1993 
Dale M. Dorius; Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City/ UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which/ 
when added to the $15/591.42 previously tendered/ is full settle-
ment of the above-referenced action. 
On October 19/ 1993 I sent you an original Notice of 
Dismissal and an original Release of Lien. Please sign the 
Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I can file it 
with the court. Please obtain Mr. Porter's signature on the 
Release of Lien/ then return it to me so that I can record it 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours/ 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43D 
Enclosure 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. Heiner 
€CD NOV 151993 
EXHIBIT G 
MAIN OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 893 
29 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
IRIQHAM CITY. UTAH 84302 
(801) 723-5219 
Dale M. Dorius 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
BRANCH OFFICE 
P.O. Box 726 
47 MAIN STREET 
GUNNISON. UTAH 84634 
(801) 528-7296 
AOMITTCO: 
UTAH STATC BAH (19651 
CALIFORNIA STATC BAR (1966) 
COLORADO STATE BAR (1968) 
November 23, 1993 
Gary Porter 
Porter & Son's Construction 
9626 S. State St. 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Re: Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance 
Corporation, et al. 
Dear Mr- Porter: 
In reviewing this file it appears that the offer of settlement 
was for the principal amount due and owing together with 8% 
interest. The sums tendered appear to be those amounts after 
giving credit for the Pioneer account. 
Would you please in writing calculate your claim that you are 
still owed $3,100.00 over the offer. Enclosed please find a copy 
of your original accounting. I again enclose copies of Mr. 
Lybbert's accounting in this regard. I would appreciate if you 
would Fax me your accounting. 
yours, 
Dale MXjDorius 
Attorney at Law 
DMD:j p 
Enclosures 
EXHIBIT H 
STEVEN H.LYBBERT 
ATTORNEY AT IAW 
Suite 808 Pelt Building 
841 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone* (801) 368-0890 
Admitted «tao la CullfornU Telecoplen (801) 863-8818 
December 13, 1993 
Dala H. Doriua, Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Raj Gary Porter etc* v. Waat American Finance Corp., et ale 
Daar Dalai 
Bnoloaad plaaaa find a oopy of tha answer I filed today to 
tha amandad complaint in tha above-referenced matter. In view of 
tha exchange of correspondence that haa occurred in thia case/ I 
am confidant tha court will find that there has been an accord 
and satisfaction or Mr, Porterfa clairae. Furthert I do not 
believe Judge Hanaen ia going to believe that Mr. Porter thought 
that the ?3/135 discount was intended to ba a credit for money 
paid to Pioneer Trucking by West American when Neat American in 
fact paid over $7,600 to Pioneer-
Here ia Keat American'a final offert If Mr. Porter will 
aign a release of lien/ and if you will sign a stipulation of 
dismissal, and if both documents are returned to ma by the end of 
thia week (or copies faxed to me and the originals mailed by the 
end of this week) Meat American will pay an additional $500*00 to 
your cliant# payable thirty days after the case ia diamiaaed. 
As you might imagine> the existence of a mechanics lien on a 
condominium project pretty much stays tha owner from selling 
units in the condominium complex. If the offer set forth above 
ia not acceptable/ and if the court eventually finds an accord 
and aatiafaction to have taken place/ Heat American will sue Mr. 
Porter for any loss it sustains as a result of its inability to 
sell oondo units during the pendancy of thia action. 
Also enclosed la a stipulation of dismissal for your 
signature* Please call roe if you have any questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours * 
Steven H. Lybbect 
EXHIBIT I 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
Laird Law Office: Highland Law Office: 
1600 Laird Avenue 3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 582-6737 (801) 273-3962 
Fax 582-6737 Fax 273-3367 
May 14, 1994 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Dale Dorius, Esq. 
Brigham City, Utah 
RE: Porter v. West American Finance Corporation 
Dear Dale: 
I know that you are not happy with my protestations in this matter. Despite your 
natural resentment against the statements I have made, I hope that you will see that the 
most important thing that happens right now is that Gary's position be protected in this 
litigation. 
Gary is adamant that he did not agree or authorize you to settle. Please see the 
Order which Judge Hanson signed. He granted summary judgment because Lybbert stated 
in his affidavit that "attorney Dale M. Dorius, representing plaintiff, sometime between 
November 5,1993 and November 11,1993" reached a final settlement with Lybbert. If this 
is true, then tell me in a facsimile transmission this coming Monday and I will drop my 
attempts to change Judge Hanson's order. If this is not true, then please provide me with 
an affidavit so stating so I can protect Gary's interests in this case. 
Thank you in advance for your professionalism and assistance.in this regard. 
Yours very truly, 
Brian W^iteffensei 
Enclosure 
EXHIBIT J 
DAU M. OORIUS #0903 
Attorney for: 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brlflhom City. Utah 84302 
723-3219 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER & ) 
SON'S CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORP., 
a Utah Corporation and 
OLYMPUS BANK, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DALE M. 
Civil No. 930902266 
DORIUS 
DALE M. DORIUS, being first duly sworn and on his oath 
states as follows: 
1. That I represented Porter & Son's Construction in the 
above matter. 
2. That numerous settlement negotiations were conducted 
with my client and the Defendant, together with their respective 
attorneys. 
3. That there was an agreed to settlement of the principal 
amount owed to Plaintiff plus eight percent interest minus 
$3,135.00, and Defendant would drop the $11,000.00 counterclaim 
set off. 
4. There was not a finalized agreement as to the amount the 
Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck charges• 
EXHIBIT K 
5. The outstanding issue is whether or not Defendant paid 
Pioneer Trucking, and if these amounts are proper offsets. This 
appears to be the only dispute in regard to the settlement. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 1994. 
VPJfcGE M. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 16th day of May, 
2 
